The documents, emails and interviews paint a picture of the Israeli authorities dismissing the plan as "aspirational," deeming it too challenging for Hamas to execute.
The classified 40-page document, codenamed "Jericho Wall," outlined a devastating invasion strategy that closely mirrored the actual attack's outcomes, resulting in approximately 1,200 casualties
The document, translated and reviewed by the New York Times, did not specify the attack's date but provided a step-by-step breakdown of an assault intended to overwhelm Gaza Strip fortifications, seize Israeli cities and storm key military bases, including a division headquarters.
Despite the detailed plan circulating widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, experts at the time believed that an attack of such scale and ambition was beyond Hamas' capabilities.
It remains unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders were aware of the document.
Last year, shortly after obtaining the document, officials in the Israeli military's Gaza division expressed uncertainty about Hamas' intentions, stating that it was not yet possible to determine whether the plan had been fully accepted. (Related: No, the Hamas invasion was not an Israeli 'intelligence failure.')
The document was considered but deemed implausible at the time.
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In July, just three months before the attacks, a veteran analyst with Unit 8200, Israel's signals intelligence agency, raised concerns about Hamas conducting a training exercise strikingly similar to the Jericho Wall blueprint.
However, a colonel in the Gaza division dismissed her warnings.
These warnings, if heeded, could have prompted the Israeli military to redirect significant reinforcements to the southern region, where the attacks eventually occurred, potentially preventing or mitigating the devastating outcome. Unfortunately, the Israeli military was ill-prepared as terrorists streamed out of the Gaza Strip, leading to the deadliest day in Israel's history.
The revelations surrounding the Jericho Wall document underscore a series of missteps over several years that culminated in what officials now regard as the most significant Israeli intelligence failure since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Israeli security officials have publicly acknowledged their failure to protect the country, prompting expectations of a government-assembled commission to investigate the events leading up to the attacks.
The critical failure in Israeli intelligence can be attributed to a deeply ingrained belief that Hamas lacked the capability and would not dare to launch such an attack. This belief persisted despite mounting evidence to the contrary, contributing to the catastrophic outcome on October 7.
Despite the close intelligence ties between the U.S. and Israel, it seems that Israel did not share the confidential battle plans with U.S. intelligence officials.
Current and former officials, granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter, revealed that there are no indications that the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) received the reported "Jericho Wall" document. One U.S. official stated, "The IC will certainly continue to review its information."
A U.S. lawmaker and a former U.S. official confirmed that Israeli officials did not provide the plans to the U.S. intelligence community. The former official expressed concern, stating, "It's very problematic" that Israel did not share such crucial information.
National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby refrained from confirming the New York Times report and deferred to Israel for comment. The Israeli Defense Forces spokesperson did not respond to requests for comment, and the Central Intelligence Agency declined to comment.
Despite the lack of information sharing, top Biden administration officials have asserted that the U.S. had no prior knowledge of Hamas planning an attack of this magnitude. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated in October, "If we had those indications, we would share them with Israel. But to my knowledge, we did not see that."
Watch this video about the New York Times reporting that Israel knew about the Hamas attack one year in advance.
This video is from the Martin Brodel channel on Brighteon.com.
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